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SCIENCE AND LOGIC 
 
In this chapter, we look at the two chapters devoted to science and logic in What is 
Philosophy?, ‘Functives and Concepts’ and ‘Prospects and Concepts’. They come 
after the chapters devoted to philosophy and before the chapter devoted to art. The 
first point to be made here is that these two chapters are not merely a third attempt to 
“cast a plane over chaos”, following those of art and philosophy. Rather, they 
correspond to a third and concluding moment in the long process of genesis we have 
been tracing throughout this book, which we call active or static genesis, after the 
passive or dynamic genesis of art and the sense or virtuality of philosophy. In fact, 
there are two distinct and successive moments of active or static genesis in What is 
Philosophy? It is science in ‘Functives and Concepts’ that corresponds to static 
ontological genesis and logic in ‘Prospects and Concepts’ that corresponds to static 
logical genesis. Deleuze and Guattari themselves divide up science and logic across 
the two chapters into three distinct orders of what they call “prospects”: a first 
prospect of functives, which are “scientific functions presented in discursive systems” 
(WP?, 117); a second prospect of logical propositions, which are “acts of reference” 
with regard to “already constituted states of affairs or bodies” (WP?, 138); and a third 
prospect of opinions, which are “subjective evaluations of judgements of taste” (WP?, 
141). Indeed, it might even be suggested that with the third prospect of opinion and 
the arrival of fully-formed representations and conscious subjects able to share them 
the process of genesis the book outlines is complete and its justification 
retrospectively given (although, as we will discover, the process of genesis is never 
able to be completed). 
 
In other words, as we have previously seen with art and philosophy, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts of science and logic in these two chapters are fundamentally 
metaphorical or at least positional. Before being used to speak about anything 
recognisable as science or logic, they are employed to indicate a certain moment in 
the progression of genesis. (However, at the same time there is a complex 
methodological question raised here, insofar as science and logic are not simply 
philosophical concepts but correspond to that moment in genesis when referentiality 
in that objective sense we are used to arises for the first time.) This positionality can 
be seen in the way in which the “referent” of science and logic changes throughout 
Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s writings. In The Fold, calculus is used to speak 
of the first dynamic genesis, in which perception is formed from “millions of 
differential micro-perceptions” (F, 81). In Difference and Repetition, as we have seen, 
it is used to speak of that successive moment of genesis, in which the Idea is made up 
of “reciprocally determined” (DR, 183) components. And in What is Philosophy?, 
finally, it is used to speak of that concluding moment of static genesis, in which the 
virtual singularities left behind by philosophy are “differenciated” (WP?, 126) to 
bring about actualised bodies.1 Indeed, in the posthumous collection Desert Islands, 
Deleuze speaks of the way that maths and science constitute “technical models” (DI, 
220), while in Difference and Repetition he speaks of science allowing 
“correspondences without resemblance” (DR, 184) with other, non-scientific fields. 
And it is just this that complexifies, without entirely disqualifying, efforts by various 
commentators to produce a Deleuzian-inspired “minor” maths or science, insofar as it 
is not exactly really-existing maths and science he is speaking about.2 The inclusion 
of the word “concept” in the titles of the chapters dealing with maths and science in 
What is Philosophy? indicates that, before all else, maths and science are to be 
  
understood philosophically, are components of the particular concept of philosophy 
that Deleuze and Guattari are attempting to construct. 
 
In fact, what both ‘Functives and Concepts’ and ‘Prospects and Concepts’ trace is a 
progressive actualisation. They follow a movement from the virtual singularities and 
internal relationships of the philosophical concept through the fully extended and 
individuated bodies of science and on to the general classes and categories of logic 
and opinion. To this extent, the overall trajectory What is Philosophy? outlines is 
from the preindividual intensity without subject of the passive syntheses of percept 
and affect through the sublimation and symbolisation of concepts that form the rules 
for the production of objects and on to the final match between subject and object in 
the active syntheses of perception and affection. Deleuze and Guattari can be seen to 
be following an arc from the undifferenciated actuality of the first moment of genesis 
through the dematerialised virtuality of the second moment of genesis and back to the 
now fully differenciated actuality of the third moment of genesis. Science and logic 
return us to where we began with art. However, all of this is too simple. The actual of 
art is not the same as the actualised of science and logic. The former is unindividuated 
and disordered, while the latter is individuated and ordered. The former starts with 
that chaotic diversity with which the process of genesis begins, while the latter 
finishes with conscious and reproducible representations. In the end, as we will come 
to see, there is a real continuum between art and science and logic. The intensity that 
is produced at the end of the third passive genesis is what drives the process of 
individuation that runs through active genesis. The three successive stages we 
observed in passive genesis – coupling, resonance and forced movement – are 
repeated in a way in active genesis. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari are 
able to suggest in What is Philosophy? that art and science “intersect” (WP?, 198). 
But this intersection can take place only through the mediation of philosophy. The 
disordered sensation without idea of art and the idea without object of philosophy 
come together to make up the subject and object of science and logic. 
 
Indeed, as we have already indicated, the whole genesis of representation set out in 
What is Philosophy? broadly repeats the trajectory of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
which similarly attempts to account for the conditions of experience. The three 
passive geneses of art replay Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and its three syntheses 
of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. The virtual concept of philosophy 
replays Kant’s Transcendental Analytic, in which the concepts necessary for thought 
are attempted to be deduced. And the active synthesis of science and logic through 
which virtual ideas are actualised replay the Kantian process of schematisation, in 
which those concepts deduced from the possibility of thought about experience are 
now applied to the actual objects of experience. In other words, we see in Kant at first 
a move away from experience towards the concepts that make it possible and then a 
move back from these concepts towards the objects in which they can be seen. As 
Kant will remark of the structure of his book, it does not matter “whether we proceed 
from the smallest element to the whole of pure reason or reverse-wise through its final 
end to each part”.3 However, if Deleuze sets himself in his work the same task as 
Kant of accounting for the possibility of experience immanently, on the basis of 
experience itself, he also differs from Kant in several crucial regards. First of all, as 
we have seen, Kant does not understand the faculties associated with the syntheses 
(sense, imagination and apperception) as arising in a genetic relationship with each 
other. Or, if he begins to do so, he ultimately installs a supervening transcendental 
  
faculty (apperception) that sits above and judges all of the others. And this is not 
unrelated to Deleuze’s other major criticism of Kant, which is that his method of 
Transcendental Deduction does not provide the conditions of real experience but only 
of possible experience. The “categories” in Kant, which are meant to derive from 
experience, merely impose upon experience a pre-existing logic, to which experience 
in turn must conform. As Deleuze writes in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: “The 
understanding’s legislative acts (categories) therefore constitute general laws, and are 
exercised on nature as objects of possible experience” (KCP, 62). As opposed to this, 
if in active synthesis there is a certain application of philosophical concepts to 
empirical reality, Deleuze is also very particular to insist that these concepts must be 
responsive to this reality. Deleuzian concepts do not pre-select experience or seek to 
determine what form it must take, but rather are conditioned at the same time as they 
condition in being the rules by which real experience is brought about. Or, as Deleuze 
says: “Both terms of the difference [determinable intuition and determinant concept] 
must be conceived as pointing towards a principle of reciprocal determination” (DR, 
173). This is exactly that “double becoming” (WP?, 109) of Ideas, in What is 
Philosophy? and elsewhere, in which the philosophical concept at once entirely 
repeats reality and entirely makes over reality.  
 
Deleuze follows the immediate post-Kantian thinker Salomon Maïmon in making his 
critique of Kant here, a critique to which it can be seen that Kant responds in his 
subsequent Critique of Judgement. But Deleuze’s other resource in thinking the 
conditions of real experience in a way beyond Kant is Leibniz. It is in Leibniz’s 
doctrine of sufficient reason that Deleuze finds a mutual coming together of the world 
and the categories used to think it. Leibniz substitutes the usual analyses of things in 
terms of essence, which treat only those qualities sufficient to distinguish the general 
category of a thing, whether it actually exists or not, with an analysis in terms of 
existence, which includes in principle everything that actually happens to a thing as 
part of its definition. As a result, there is an unprecedented breaking down of 
experience to its absolute singularities, because at once everything that happens to 
something is included in the definition of that thing and everything that happens is 
potentially itself able to become a thing. This is Leibniz’s reciprocal doctrine of 
indiscernibility, in which every single thing, such as a leaf or a drop of water, has its 
own concept, so that if every concept includes everything it is also true that every 
concept corresponds to an individual thing.4 And yet, as with Kant, if Leibniz 
approaches immanence in thinking the granular conditions of real experience, he also 
turns away from what he opens up. At the very moment he countenances the 
possibility of a non-selective and non-hierarchical concept, coming as close as it can 
to the singular individual it nominates, he introduces the notion of “vice-diction”, 
whereby God chooses only the “best” of all possible worlds to pass into existence, by 
which Leibniz means a world of maximum of continuity and clarity, in which monads 
for all of their differences and divergent points of view all “converge” upon the same 
consistent world. It is exactly against this that Deleuze will insist on the crucial 
generative capacity of an incompossible “vague” or “ambiguous” object that would 
be forbidden by Leibniz, such as an Adam who does not sin or the various 
irreconcilable fates of the Roman king’s son Sextus Tarquin (F, 61), which allows us 
to begin to think beyond the individuality of singular monads and construct more 
general classes and categories. 
 
  
In this chapter, we trace a progression from the fully differentiated but virtual concept 
through the individuation and differenciation of objects and on to the wider logical 
categories and subjects able to think them. In fact, it is an end point – and Deleuze 
and Guattari acknowledge this – that is shared with Kant. As they write in the 
‘Conclusion’ of What is Philosophy?, repeating Kant’s example from the Critique of 
Pure Reason: “If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, 
sometimes heavy… my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when 
representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar” (WP?, 202). But, as we will 
discover, their respective ways of getting there are different, and for Deleuze and 
Guattari the problem of genesis does not even end with the familiar notion of 
cinnabar, as it does for Kant. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze draws a 
distinction between “living” and “dead” representations (DR, 262-5), and in The 
Logic of Sense and What is Philosophy? he speaks of the way in which philosophy 
“counter-actualises” (LS, 171-3) or “counter-effectuates” (WP?, 159-60) the actual. 
And this is to say that, if Deleuze and Guattari are not directly opposed to 
representation in What is Philosophy?, they nevertheless understand it as part of an 
ongoing genesis that does not come to a halt with logical categories and subjects 
endowed with consciousness. Rather, the conclusion of genesis leads to further 
genesis or returns us to the beginning of genesis, which is to suggest that all three 
stages of genesis occur at the same time as reciprocally defining components of the 
concept of philosophy. And we pursue this analysis here through a reading of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of “functives” in terms of Leibniz’s monads, as outlined in the 
chapter ‘Sufficient Reason’ of Deleuze’s The Fold. We then look at how the 
“intensity” that is left over at the end of the third passive synthesis selects 
singularities and relationships from the philosophical concept to become individuated 
or actualised in a process Deleuze calls “dramatisation”, as elaborated in the essay 
‘The Method of Dramatisation’. We then identify the movement from science to logic 
or from the functive to the prospect in relation to the passage from good to common 
sense in the static ontological genesis and then from common sense to logical 
proposition in the static logical genesis through a reading of Deleuze’s The Logic of 
Sense. Finally, we characterise the “opinion” or “signification” that comes after logic 
as a third prospect or culminating moment in genesis through a reading, perhaps 
surprisingly, of Deleuze and Guattari’s first collaboration, Anti-Oedipus. 
 
*          *          * 
 
In ‘Functives and Concepts’, Deleuze and Guattari speak of what they call “functives” 
(WP?, 117), which are scientific propositions presented in discursive form. Functives, 
we might say, deal not so much with actual fact, as in real science, as with facticity, 
the constitution of fact or how fact comes about and is grasped in the world. Indeed, 
functives can be scientific, mathematical or even biological in character, but what 
strictly defines them is their attitude towards “chaos”. The chaos that confronts 
functives is spoken of as “containing all possible particles and drawing out all 
possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency 
or reference, without consequence” (WP?, 118). It sounds like the chaos that comes 
before art – which also disappears as soon as it appears – but, crucially, it is a chaos 
that is also described as “virtual” (WP?, 118). Deleuze and Guattari speak of it as the 
same chaos that philosophy confronts, but we might better describe it as the chaos of 
philosophy. In an understanding that very much goes against the independence of art, 
philosophy and science, but that on the contrary points to the genetic connection 
  
between them, what seems clear is that science begins with what is left behind by 
philosophy. The chaos science inherits is not the appearing and disappearing chaos of 
art but the chaos rendered “consistent” (WP?, 118) of the virtual singularities and 
internal relations of philosophy, arriving in any order and at infinite speed. And what 
is it that the functives of science seek to do with these singularities and relations? In 
the first instance, they seek to slow them down, separate them and put them in an 
ordered sequence. As opposed to philosophy, which attempts to make chaos 
consistent and self-referential without losing its original intensity, functives begin the 
process of distinguishing its various parts, laying them out next to each other, and 
cancelling its intensity, so that it might form a bounded object. As Deleuze puts it in 
Difference and Repetition: “[Intensity] is cancelled by extension, extension being the 
process by which intensive difference is turned inside out and cancelled” (DR, 233). 
And it does this in the first instance by drawing a limit between two things, so that 
there is something inside and something outside. Or, to put this otherwise, this limit is 
something. That is, although the limits of functives introduce a limit into the world, 
they also constitute this world. Again, as Deleuze writes in Difference and Repetition: 
“Good sense essentially distributes or repartitions: ‘on the one hand’ and ‘on the 
other’ are characteristic formulations” (DR, 224). And functives in What is 
Philosophy? similarly have – and even in a way allow – this extension-giving and 
boundary-drawing capacity. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “The first functives are 
therefore the limit and the variable, and reference is a relationship between values of 
the variables, as abscissae of speeds, with the limit” (WP?, 118-9). 
 
For those without mathematical training, functives here might be imagined as that line 
running across and either up or down a gridded graph, matching values on the y-axis 
(the limit or ordinate) with values on the x-axis (variables or abscissae). The line of a 
functive in a mathematical differential equation puts together not merely values that 
proportionally change (say, 2/3 in relation to 4/6), but values in which one is of a 
higher power than the other (y2/x = P). Thus the derivative as the quotient of the two 
differentials that form a relation of the type dy/dx allows two otherwise 
incommensurable quantities to be determined precisely as their relationship to each 
other. Indeed, in the vanishingly small quantities of differentials or in something like 
the cusp of an inflected curve, in which the values on the y-axis move from positive to 
negative across a single point, there is implied a kind of infinity. And Deleuze and 
Guattari use this to suggest that in the functives of something like a differential 
equation infinity is able to be represented. Intensive change or velocity as limit or 
input on the y-axis is able to be matched with – or rather cancels itself out in giving 
rise to – extensive values as variables or output on the x-axis. In this regard, Deleuze 
and Guattari are able to suggest that the true post-calculus revolution in mathematics 
is not so much the discovery of infinitesimals as being able to work with infinity in 
order to give it a comparative value. As they write of the 19th-century German 
mathematician Georg Cantor’s notion of transfinitude: “What [Cantor’s] theory of 
sets does is inscribe the limit within the infinite itself, without which there could be 
no limit: in its strict hierarchisation, it installs a slowing down” (WP?, 120-1). And, 
more generally, the whole vocation of science is to give apparently absolute forms or 
forces a numerical value or limit: “The speed of light, absolute zero, the quantum of 
action, the Big Bang” (WP?, 119). Hence the defining quality of mathematical 
functives is that at no point do they simply break off or have a gap or lacuna within 
them. Everything can be represented and given a value somewhere on their x- and y-
axes. Or, if something cannot be represented in one functive, it can be in another, 
  
which begins where it breaks off. In this sense, the whole world can be understood as 
an endless series of functives, each one starting where another ends, almost like 
individual perspectives onto the world (and the world for its part would be nothing 
outside of these functives).5 It is for this reason that the “plane of reference” (WP?, 
118) of maths and science – that which the functives form and to which they refer – is 
not single and united like the plane of immanence of philosophy, but rather made up 
of innumerable limits that are always splitting, reforming and multiplying. And, 
against the common understanding, the project of maths and science is not to unify or 
gather everything together under a single overarching equation, but always to invent, 
create, produce new functives, thus breaking with any possible unity (WP?, 206-7). 
 
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari describe three different functives, which correspond to 
three successive stages of individuation. The first is the “state of affairs” (WP?, 122), 
which arises not from the simple matching of limit and variable, but – because the 
intensive limit can be seen only through its corresponding variable, in a kind of 
reciprocal determination – the intersection of two independent variables, which 
produces in turn a third variable as the “state of affairs”. In a sense, the state of affairs 
represents a first “touching down” (WP?, 119) of the intensity and virtual singularities 
of philosophy. The intensive ordinate selects which values are to be represented as 
abscissae, while these extensive abscissae are the form in which the intensity of the 
ordinate is expressed. Deleuze and Guattari speak of states of affairs in terms of 
“ordered mixtures” that come out of “closed” systems (WP?, 123), that is, each 
particular state of affairs does not take into account any other, and they compare them 
to “derivative” functions in mathematics (WP?, 122) because, like a derivative, in 
states of affairs two “differentials” of potentially infinite different powers are 
compared and placed in relation to each other. The next type of functive Deleuze and 
Guattari call a “thing” (WP?, 122). Here, by contrast, the variables that make it up are 
not merely mixtures, but combine to form relations, even if as we will see what is 
produced remains at the same level as the variables that make it up. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write: “A thing is always related to several axes at once according to 
variables that are functions of each other, even if the internal unity remains 
undetermined” (WP?, 122). They speak of things in terms of the “interactions” 
between “coupled” systems (WP?, 1234), which is to suggest that things form 
relations with other things (and this echo of the “coupling” that characterises the first 
stage of passive genesis is significant here), although they also later speak of this 
second stage of the functive as transitory, a “passage” from the state of affairs to the 
body through the “intermediary of a potential or power” (WP?, 154). And the third 
and final functive Deleuze and Guattari describe as a “body” (WP?, 122), which as 
opposed to the simple “undetermined” unity of the thing involves an “invariant and a 
group of transformations” (WP?, 122). With the body, indeed, the possible 
substitution of elements that make it up, as opposed to the thing, becomes 
increasingly limited, until there is, as Deleuze and Guattari say, a “perfect 
individuation” (WP?, 123). Deleuze and Guattari describe the body in terms of the 
“communication” between “separated, unconnected” systems (WP?, 123), which 
implies that bodies take the form they do in relation to other bodies.6 Examples of the 
body Deleuze and Guattari provide are the forms of Euclidean geometry such as a 
triangle, which is made up of three vertices or singular points and ordinary points 
stretching between them, and biological species, which grow and develop in response 
both to internal (endo-referential) and external (exo-referential) factors (WP?, 123).  
 
  
What Deleuze and Guattari are implicitly speaking of here with functives is the 
Leibnizian theory of monads. What we find in this passage from states of affairs 
through things to bodies is a vocabulary to describe how we move from the infinite 
and self-identical attributes of God through to the infinitely divisible and discernible 
monads that are his earthly expression. But, if this passage is narrated in What is 
Philosophy? as a movement from a single undivided concept through to perfectly 
individuated and distinguishable bodies, in fact what Deleuze and Guattari find in 
Leibniz is an alternative to the long-running Aristotelian argument that individuals are 
formed by the “breaking down” of more general categories. On the contrary, in 
Leibniz individuals are built up from smaller predicates and differences, and it is on 
the basis of these individuals that wider categories are formed. As Deleuze writes in 
Difference and Repetition: “There is a differenciation of differenciation which 
integrates and welds together the differenciated” (DR, 217).7 And we see this also in 
‘Functives and Concepts’. We begin with the state of affairs, which is the first 
cancellation of intensity in its spacing out or extension as points along a line. But the 
state of affairs is merely the first emergence of order out of chaos, so that, although 
the variables that make it up intersect, they are “independent” of each other and 
produce only other variables. Each functive is “closed”, bearing no relation to any 
other, but tracing only a momentary limit or series of stopping points that soon break 
off to be replaced by another functive that has no memory of it (WP?, 153). Then on 
the next level we have the thing, in which the sometimes several variables that make 
it up are not simply independent, but related to each other without anything beyond 
that relation. Finally, we have the fully individuated body, which is “invariant” 
although taking different forms. Here we can see, in a kind of extension of the logic 
of the thing, that each body is at once “separate and unconnected” and that each 
“communicates” with all of the others. And all of this is like the logic of the 
Leibnizian monad, in which each monad expresses the entire world, including all of 
the other monads that make it up, but only expresses clearly that portion of it closest 
to its own body. In other words, each monad is composed of a singularity that extends 
over all of the other ordinary points that make up its body, which represents the way 
in which it dominates or offers a perspective onto these points, up to that point where 
another singularity begins, which equally extends over a series of ordinary points, 
including that original singularity, that make up its body.8 And overseeing all of these 
monads, ensuring that they converge on the same world, for all of their different 
perspectives onto it, is God, who chooses the “best of all possible worlds”, by which 
Leibniz means a maximum continuity and compossibility of monads. And in all of 
this, as we can see, what Deleuze and Guattari are tracing is a progressive building up 
or “integration” of monads from those original singularities of states of affairs 
through a repeated differenciation.9 
 
It is in the chapter ‘Sufficient Reason’ of Deleuze’s The Fold that we can find a 
similar passage to that from the concept through to the individuated body in 
‘Functives and Concepts’, described in terms of that from the auto-inclusive “infinity” 
(F, 44) of the Identical through to the infinitely divisible “individual notion” (F, 67) 
of the monad. The whole trajectory Deleuze characterises as going from “inflexion” 
to “inclusion”, that is, from the “event” that happens to the line or point to the 
incorporation of this “event” in the line or point (F, 41). The first stage in this 
procedure of sufficient reason that would make the event equal to its predicates is the 
“Definable”. This is the initial connection between predicates or parts, which takes 
the absolutely simple notion, A, B and so on, of the Identical and expresses it in the 
  
form AB, which breaks the whole of the Identical into extensive parts, thus rendering 
everything comparable, insofar as it is submitted to a principle of similitude (F, 46). 
Then comes the “Conditionable”, in which there arise for the first time “relations” 
between the various parts that make it up (F, 46). Here there is no longer an extension 
without limits, as with the Definable, but an “intension” (F, 47) converging towards a 
limit. And this intension or intensity produces what Leibniz calls a “texture”, as 
something like the “sum” of the Conditionable’s inner qualities (F, 47). It is this that 
allows Leibniz to speak of the “characteristic” with regard to the Conditionables, as 
opposed to the mere “combination” formed by the Definables (F, 47). But this same 
characteristic is to be found in several Conditionables (or, inversely, each 
Conditionable has several characteristics), insofar as they only tend towards limits (F, 
49). As Deleuze writes of Leibniz’s conception of gold: “We have more than one 
notion of the same subject, for example, weight and malleability for gold” (F, 50). 
The final stage Deleuze outlines from Leibniz is the “Individual”, which is marked by 
an “infinite convergence” (F, 49), so that, unlike the Conditionable, there can be no 
two identical Individuals. Each Individual, again in a difference from the 
Conditionable, which is comprised of several characteristics, lies at the intersection of 
an infinite number of characteristics or qualities, but its absolutely singular identity is 
given by which particular combination of qualities it expresses clearly and which 
confusedly. (Again, each Individual expresses the same world, including that 
expressed by other Individuals, although clearly only that part of it closest to its 
body.) Another Individual begins when its singularity is able to offer another 
perspective onto the world, expressing clearly what its neighbours can express only 
confusedly. 
 
Throughout we can observe an intricate series of parallels between the process of 
“inclusion” Deleuze outlines in ‘Sufficient Reason’ and those successive stages of 
“individuation” Deleuze and Guattari set out in ‘Functives and Concepts’. In the 
Definables, there is a shift from “primary or indefinable Identicals” to “simple 
derived beings, defined by two primary beings in a simple relation” (F, 45), and this 
is like the state of affairs, which comes about as a result of the intersection not 
between a limit and a variable but between two variables, which produces a third 
variable. In the Conditionables, the extended parts of the Definables, which were 
previously without relation, “acquire relations by becoming requisites or the 
[reciprocal] definers of the derived” (F, 46), and this is like the thing, which is related 
to several axes at once, which are functions of each other, even if their internal unity 
remains undetermined. In Individuals, the singular substance of the monad can be 
“interior to movement, or a unity of change that can be active” (F, 55), and this is like 
the body, which is constituted by an invariant in relation to a group of movements. 
Similarly, in terms of the process of individuation itself, with the Definables, it is an 
“infinity by way of cause that constitutes wholes and parts” (F, 46), like that infinity 
of the intensive limit that allows the extensive values of the variable to be selected to 
form a state of affairs. With the Conditionables, it is not a matter of simple definers or 
limits, as with the Definables, but of “designating conditions, limits and differential 
relations among the limits” (F, 47), and this movement towards convergence is like 
the division into individuated bodies from the subsisting state of affairs that is the 
thing. And with Individuals, something is “no longer defined either by itself [as with 
the Identicals] or by the ‘limit’ of a series [as with both the Definables and 
Conditionables, in different ways], but by a law of order or continuity that classifies 
limits or transforms series into a ‘totality’” (F, 50), and this is like bodies, whose 
  
perfect individuation comes about as a result of them being in communication with 
other Individuals in a convergence guaranteed by a pre-established harmony or law of 
continuity. 
 
*          *          * 
 
However, we might pause at this point and ask how it is that we can pass from 
Identicals to Individuals or from the concept to the body? What drives this process of 
individuation whereby the disordered virtual singularities and internal relations of 
philosophy are turned first into ordered and extended points and then into integrated 
bodies? And what continues to drive this process of actualisation beyond individual 
bodies or monads through to more general classes and categories and ultimately into 
logical propositions and opinions? For, as Deleuze and Guattari write in ‘Prospects 
and Concepts’, the interaction of bodies in individuation already conditions a “proto-
perceptibility” and “proto-affectivity” that we will see in the “perceptions” and 
“affections” of opinion (WP?, 154). In fact, as Deleuze makes clear in Difference and 
Repetition, it is not a direct passage from Ideas to individuated bodies. 
Differenciation, the externally determined elaboration of points and qualities in 
empirical objects, does not immediately follow from differentation, the internally 
determined production of singularities and relations between elements in the virtual 
Idea. Rather, it is mediated by a process of “dramatisation”, which Deleuze compares 
to the Kantian “schemata”, whereby the categories of Understanding are applied to 
appearances. We have already seen the equivalent of Kantian synthesis in the passive 
syntheses of art, in which we pass from diverse sensation to a certain thought of time. 
In the third synthesis of art we get the dissolution of the subject and the production of 
intensity. Then arises the virtual of philosophy, which contains the rules for the 
determinability of experience. Now in the three active syntheses of science we get a 
putting together of the passive syntheses of art with the virtual of philosophy to lead 
us towards the actual representation of objects and a subject able to think them. In a 
way, as we will see, we have a repetition of the three passive syntheses of art, but 
mediated through the virtual idea or concept of philosophy. Just as in Kant, the virtual 
Idea is worth nothing in itself, but must be taken outside of itself, in order to become 
an object. And what takes the idea out of itself is intensity in a process of 
dramatisation (DR, 245). But, equally, intensity merely loses itself unless guided by 
the rule or blueprint of the Idea. As Deleuze writes, in echo of Kant’s famous 
“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”,10 of the 
mutual coming together of Idea and intensity in the three active syntheses: “A concept 
alone is completely incapable of specifying or dividing itself… However, the 
[Kantian] schema does not account for the power with which it acts. Everything 
changes when the dynamisms are posited no longer as the schemata of concepts but as 
dramas of Ideas” (DR, 218). The virtual singularities and internal relations of the Idea 
are taken out of themselves by the progressive playing out of intensity, while intensity 
itself is progressively cancelled or explicated in the form of extended points and the 
relations found between them. In a sense, intensity comes first. It is obviously already 
there in the passive geneses before the Idea, and as we have seen it is what literally 
creates the space in which differenciation takes place. But, in another sense, intensity 
can be seen only through the actualised forms in which it is found. It does not exist 
outside of those individuated bodies it makes possible, although it is not to be reduced 
to them. Intensity is, as Deleuze says, “transcendent”: it is not so much given as that 
by which the given is given (DR, 222). And yet – and this is Deleuze’s difference 
  
from Kant – if intensity is that by which the given is given, it is also at each point 
only the given. 
 
We see all of this in ‘Functives and Concepts’ in the initial functive that constitutes 
the state of affairs. For if it can be understood as a simple matching up of the 
intensive values of the ordinates with the extensive values of the abscissae, it also 
represents a certain selection by ordinates of abscissae. If intensity can be seen only 
through extensity – which is why the state of affairs is composed of two variables 
rather than a limit and a variable – it is nevertheless intensity that decides where these 
extensities will be, where the limit will be drawn (or, more simply, just is this 
extensity and limit, insofar as space itself does not exist before it). As Deleuze and 
Guattari write in ‘Functives and Concepts’: “A state of affairs does not actualise a 
chaotic virtual without taking from it a potential that is distributed in the system of co-
ordinates” (WP?, 122). And this is to suggest that this intensity is not entirely 
exhausted by this formed limit. With the result that, even as we move through the 
successive stages of individuation, and this intensity is progressively explicated, it 
nevertheless remains. The successive stage of the “thing”, between the first extension 
of the state of affairs and the fully integrated or individuated body, is precisely 
described as an “intension”, made up out of the “sum of its inner qualities” (F, 47). It 
is undoubtedly with the thing that we see most clearly intensity beginning to gather up 
points or predicates in a continuity or convergence on the way to becoming an 
individuated body. (The mathematical analogy would be that “power series” or 
repeated “differentiation of differentiation” that would also bring about an 
integration.11) Finally, if with the fully individuated body there appears for the first 
time a certain internality or self-selection, insofar as it does not merely interact but 
actually communicates with the outside, there is nevertheless an equivalent external 
selection or selection by another that makes this possible. If the external factors that 
will count can be chosen by the body, the body also takes the form it does because of 
a principle greater than it (in Leibniz, for example, God). This is what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean by speaking of bodies in terms of both endo- and exo-reference in 
‘Functives and Concepts’. And it is why, with regard to evolution and embryology, 
Deleuze opposes the doctrines both of epigenesis, in which the embryo is simply the 
outcome of external forces, and preformism, in which the development of the embryo 
is merely the playing out of a predetermined process (DR, 251). Rather, the true 
enigma of the living creature’s growth is that the “egg”, even at the earliest stage of 
its development, at once shapes the world and is shaped by the world. As Deleuze 
writes in Difference and Repetition: “The vital egg is already a field of individuation, 
and the embryo is a pure individual, and the one in the other testifies to the primacy of 
individuation over actualisation – in other words, over both organisation and the 
determination of species” (DR, 250). And this is also to be seen in Leibniz’s 
monadology, in which monads are at once able to select which world they are the 
outcome of and are the infinite outcome of this world: “The world is in the monad, 
but the monad lives for the world. God himself conceives individual notions only as a 
function of the world that they express, and chooses them only through a calculus of 
the world” (F, 50-1).  
 
It is this intensity and the question of selection it opens up that Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of in ‘Functives and Concepts’ in the guise of a discussion of the role of 
scientists’ names in science. As we have already seen, Deleuze and Guattari analyse 
the way in which the world is actualised through a series of splits or bifurcations, a 
  
boundary drawn between two things that were previously regarded as the same. And 
this can be understood as akin to the monadic process of selection, insofar as the 
monad is the decision as to what to make clear and what to leave confused – and the 
agent or intensity behind this process in science can be called the scientist’s “proper 
name” (WP?, 128). Examples of this split or bifurcation Deleuze and Guattari give in 
‘Functives and Concepts’ are brought about not only in the elements, as in 19th-
century Russian chemist Dmitry Mendeleyev’s periodic table, but also between 
rational and real numbers and even between Newtonian and Einsteinian conceptions 
of the universe (WP?, 123-4). Indeed, in the light of this split – and this is important 
in terms of the relationship between differenciation and integration, and perhaps even 
as we will see good and common sense – it s not merely pre-existing unities that are 
prospectively split, but such unities can themselves now be regarded only as splits-to-
come, in effect, only the putting-back-together of what is already split. As Deleuze 
and Guattari write: “But in the other simultaneous direction, from after to before, the 
whole number appears as a particular case of the fractional number, or the rational as 
a particular case of a ‘break’ in a linear set of points” (WP?, 124). (It is for this reason 
that Deleuze and Guattari speak of integration and differenciation as the “two poles” 
(WP?, 126) of functives, which is ultimately to say that integration is only an effect of 
differenciation, a certain taking further of differenciation. And this is just as Deleuze 
in Difference and Repetition says that in biological classification it is not individuals 
that are an illusion in relation to species, but species that are an illusion in relation to 
individuals (DR, 250).) It is for this reason, finally, that scientist’s names work 
differently in science than philosophers’ do in philosophy. In philosophy, as we have 
seen, philosophers’ names (or the philosophical systems that they nominate) double 
what they speak of, which is to say the prior philosophical system, and through it the 
world, that is their subject. That is, when one philosophical system adds a component 
to the one before it, it does not so much refute as propose another entirely different 
explanation for it. Thus when Kant adds the component of time to Descartes’ Cogito, 
it is not that Descartes is suddenly wrong or outmoded, but that henceforth what he is 
saying can be grasped only for the reason that Kant himself provides: the equivalence 
of the “I” to itself can now only be understood as taking place through the invisible 
medium of time (WP?, 31-2). By contrast, a scientific system does not leave the 
previous one intact, but either introduces a split within it or shows that it is only the 
putting together of a previous split. It does not repeat it as whole and only able to be 
doubled, but as merely a “particular case” (WP?, 126) and the effect of a split either 
in the past or yet to come. Thus real does not simply break with rational number, but 
reveals rational number as a subset of real. Einstein does not simply break with 
Newton, but reveals Newton’s classical as a subset of Einstein’s quantum mechanics, 
applicable only in particular circumstances. It is for this reason that Deleuze and 
Guattari are able to characterise science as existing in a “serial, ramifying” rather than 
a “stratigraphic” time, and the history of science as “paradigmatic” rather than 
“syntagmatic” (WP?, 124), insofar as each successive scientific system breaks with 
what comes before, meaning that we do not continually have to go back to it, as 
opposed to philosophy, where it is always a matter of re-reading the same texts 
differently (WP?, 124-5).12 
 
Crucially, however, scientists play another role in ‘Functives and Concepts’. For 
immediately after speaking of them in terms of “proper names”, Deleuze and Guattari 
go on to speak of them as “ideal intercessors” or “partial observers”, in which they no 
longer function as “total observers” (WP?, 129), like a monad or better the God 
  
behind all monads. Indeed, the expression “partial observer” is particularly 
appropriate with regard to this second conception of the role of scientists because, 
above all, it is a matter here of “seeing” (WP?, 128), which implies a certain going 
beyond of the strictly numerical limits of functives, but not necessarily a seeing of 
everything. Indeed, an example of this “seeing” that Deleuze and Guattari provide, 
originally in Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense (LS, 64-5), lies in the field of mathematics 
itself, when mathematicians “indicate the course of calculation and anticipate the 
results without ever being able to bring them about” (WP?, 128). But perhaps the 
most important example of this second type of functive or second kind of relationship 
to the functive that Deleuze and Guattari provide – which also appeared before in 
Deleuze’s The Fold (F, 21-2) – is the problem of the geometric cone, as originally set 
out by Leibniz and then by the 17th-century French mathematician Girard Desargues. 
Here it is precisely a matter of a “partial observer”, insofar as every observer of the 
cone sees something different and irreconcilable about it. Even an observer standing 
at the point of the cone, who is notionally in a position to see everything about it, in 
fact only sees some things about it and not others. As Deleuze and Guattari write: 
“But perspective fixes a partial observer, like an eye, at the summit of the cone, and 
so grasps contours without grasping reliefs or the quality of the surface that refers to 
another observer position” (WP?, 129). However, as Deleuze and Guattari insist, this 
inability to see everything or necessary generalisation is not at all a simple limit to 
knowledge. Rather, it represents a different kind of knowledge. In their words, this 
scientific perspectivism or even relativism represents not so much the “relativity of 
truth” as the “truth of the relative” (WP?, 130).13 Or, as they elsewhere put it – 
against the common understanding of science, but also against Leibniz’ principle of 
sufficient reason, which is directed by an all-seeing God – what is properly at stake in 
science is a “demon” of the kind spoken of by the 19th-century British experimental 
physicist James Maxwell. In a way, it is because this demon cannot be grasped that all 
else can be (or, to put this otherwise, this demon must remain unknown because it 
accounts for so many incompatible and yet really existing results). As Deleuze and 
Guattari write: “It is not a question of what [the ‘subjects’ of science] can or cannot 
do, but of the way in which they are perfectly positive, from the point of view of 
concept or function, even in what they do not know and cannot do” (WP?, 129). 
 
It is in the essay ‘The Method of Dramatisation’, originally delivered as a lecture to 
the French Society of Philosophy in 1967, during the writing of Difference and 
Repetition, that Deleuze addresses the question of what exactly it is that drives this 
stage of active genesis, what takes the Idea away from the virtual and leads it towards 
an object with extension and qualities. It is what Deleuze calls the “spatio-temporal 
dynamism” of “dramatisation” (‘D’, 94), describing it in the following terms: 
“Beneath organisation and specification, we discover nothing more than spatio-
temporal dynamisms: that is to say, pure syntheses of space. The most general 
characteristics of branching, order and chaos, right on up to generic and specific 
characteristics, already depend on such directions of development” (‘D’, 96). It is a 
process that, as we have seen, Deleuze compares to Kantian schematism, which 
similarly takes the abstract concept and gives it to the objects of intuition. However, 
consistent with Deleuze’s critical method, if this moment of active genesis is 
consistent with schematism, there are also important differences between them. In 
Kant, for all of his emphasis on the creativity of schematism – “This schematism of 
our understanding… is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real 
modes of activity nature is hardly ever likely to allow us to discover”14 – the concept 
  
still passes largely unchanged from the faculty of Understanding where it originates 
through the mediation of Imagination and into the object. Experience in effect is seen 
through and arises as an effect of a prior logical concept, meaning that it can be 
recognised only insofar as it conforms to this concept. By contrast, if in Deleuze it is 
the virtual singularities and relations of the Idea that are directed towards the object, 
this Idea also does not exist outside of the object and can be seen only through it. The 
dramatisation of active genesis, whereby through a process of differenciation the 
virtual singularities and relations of the Idea are progressively actualised, is not 
merely passive as in Kant’s schemata but precisely active, insofar as it brings about 
something that was not already present in the Idea. Again, as Deleuze emphasises in 
‘Dramatisation’: “However, we must emphasise the absolute condition of non-
resemblance [between the Idea and its actualisation]: the species or the quality do not 
resemble the differential relations that it incarnates, no more so than the singularities 
resemble the organised extension which actualises them” (‘D’, 100). And it is this that 
is implied, we would say, in the essential “I don’t know” (WP?, 128) to be seen in the 
sciences. But, again – and this is another distinction from Kant – for all of the 
emphasis on the “activity” of dramatisation in Deleuze, it is nevertheless not the 
activity of a conscious agent. The first stage of active genesis, individuation, is 
brought about through either a proper name or a “necessary reason” (WP?, 126). And 
a second stage, which we have begun to elaborate, is a brought about by an “ideal 
intercessor” or “partial observer”. And this is as Deleuze speaks in ‘Dramatisation’ 
first of a “larval” or “embryonic” subject (‘D’, 94) that brings about individuation or 
good sense and then a “difference operator” or “obscure precursor” (‘D’, 97) that 
brings about a second moment of differenciation or common sense. 
 
In ‘Dramatisation’, Deleuze sets out the process by which intensity “dramatises” or 
differenciates Ideas in three successive stages. These three stages of active genesis 
echo the three similar stages of passive genesis (with the difference that they are 
spatial and operate through the Idea and larval subject, whereas the passive syntheses 
are temporal and lead up to the Idea and dissolve the subject): “coupling”, “internal 
resonance” and “inevitable movement” (‘D’, 97). It is the first of these , “coupling”, 
that has largely been spoken of so far in the context of ‘Functives and Concepts’, and 
it is described in ‘Dramatisation’ in terms recognisable to us as, “even when we 
cannot [yet] distinguish actual parts, we still single out remarkable regions or points” 
(‘D’, 96). But Deleuze goes on in ‘Dramatisation’ to outline two subsequent stages of 
differenciation that we have already seen hinted at in ‘Functives and Concepts’, in 
which we have no longer simply fully individuated bodies or monads made up of 
extended points and the sum of their predicates but independent actualised objects 
made up of differential qualities. The first is “internal resonance”, in which, as 
opposed to the divisible parts of “coupling”, there is a “synthesis of qualification or 
specification” (‘D’, 96), which differenciates not the singular points but the 
relationship between qualities of the Idea. And the second is “inevitable movement’, 
in which, beyond both coupling and resonance, but arising out of them, there is a kind 
of “amplitude that goes beyond the most basic series themselves” (‘D’, 97). (Deleuze 
will say that the quantitative differences of coupling and the qualitative differences of 
resonance are not possible without each other – “There is no quality without an 
extension underlying it, and no species without organic parts or points” (‘D’, 96) – 
and in some ways “inevitable movement” is the putting together of these two 
processes.) This progression from “coupling” through “internal resonance” and onto 
“inevitable movement” can sound merely like that “individuation” we have already 
  
looked at in ‘Functives and Concepts’ – and in some respects it is – but we want to 
suggest that what is also at stake is something that takes us beyond individual 
monads, which are defined by the rule of convergence of sufficient reason. In fact, we 
want to suggest that when Deleuze speaks of the “internal resonance” produced by 
putting “intensive series”, we might say monads, into relationships, this is no longer 
ruled by convergence but opens up a certain divergence. This “divergence” (‘D’, 102) 
is only hinted at towards the end of ‘Dramatisation’ – and Deleuze generally has 
trouble working it into his discussion of monadic individuation, as in the separate 
chapter devoted to it that comes after ‘Sufficient Reason’ in The Fold – but it seems 
to be implied by his description of what he calls the “difference operator” or “obscure 
precursor” there (‘D’, 97), which again we would want to relate to the “ideal 
intercessors” and “partial observers” of ‘Functives and Concepts’. Here is how 
Deleuze describes the actions of the “obscure precursor” in ‘Dramatisation’, in a way 
that suggests that they go beyond that extension of points and summation of 
predicates of individuation, understood as a kind of good sense, and begins to explain 
how it is that the differenciation of the Idea is able to produce something that is not 
already in either its singularities or qualities: “A lightning bolt flashes between 
different intensities, but it is preceded by an obscure precursor, invisible, 
imperceptible, which determines in advance the path as in a negative relief, because 
this path is first the agent of communication between series of differences” (‘D’, 
97).15 
 
*          *          * 
 
Deleuze, as we have seen, outlines in ‘Dramatisation’ three distinct stages of active 
synthesis: coupling, internal resonance and inevitable movement. The first, coupling, 
we have already looked at in some detail. It is the process Deleuze and Guattari call 
“individuation”, in which that intensity deriving from the end of passive genesis is 
cancelled, first as single points extended along a line and then as the coming together 
of these points in an individual body. But the crucial aspect of this individuation, even 
though it is not immediately apparent, is that the final body or monad produced is 
nothing more than the “sum” of the predicates that make it up (F, 47). In other words, 
as Leibniz emphases in his doctrine of sufficient reason, the predicates that make up a 
monad are “analytic” (LS, 131) or “non-attributive” (F, 53). Each applies with an 
equal directness or immediacy to the world they bring about, only more or less 
clearly. There is no wider generality, when two monads are defined by the same 
quality or the same quality can be seen in two different monads, or perhaps only in the 
transitional stage of the “thing”, in which the final individuation is not complete. As 
Deleuze puts it in the chapter ‘Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty’ of The Fold: 
“We begin with the world as if with a series of inflections or events: it is a pure 
emission of singularities. Here, for example, are the three singularities [that make up 
Adam]: to be the first man, to live in a garden of paradise, to have a wife created from 
one’s own rib. And then a fourth: sinning” (F, 60). The second moment of active 
genesis, internal resonance, is what we might think of as the succeeding stage of 
actualisation. It precisely puts qualities or predicates together that do not usually 
belong together to produce something that is not simply to be found in them or not 
merely to be reduced to them. That is, predicates here are not analytic but synthetic, in 
that they are not equivalent to the object in which they are found, but help to create a 
new object. Leibniz’s famous example – which he ultimately rejects – is an Adam, 
hitherto defined by the predicates first man, living in the garden of paradise, out of 
  
whose rib Eve is created and sinner, to whom the predicate “resistance to temptation” 
is added (F, 61). What is produced is not so much a contradiction, insofar as it is not, 
to the extent that it is predicate of existence not essence, a matter of opposition, but 
what Leibniz calls a “vice-diction”, insofar as it points, against an order in which 
monads are defined by a continuity in which the difference between them is meant to 
disappear, to the possibility of other worlds. Now we have a world in which it is 
possible that the “same” Adam both sins and does not sin or, put otherwise, different 
worlds that do not converge towards but diverge from each other. Nevertheless, it is 
this moment of putting irreconcilable qualities together that Deleuze insists is a 
necessary part of genesis, the process by which objects become not merely the 
analytic sum of their predicates but a generality that can be used in different 
circumstances, that can cross unconnected worlds and still be understood. As he puts 
it with respect to an Adam, who is not perhaps the Adam we know but who can still 
be called the same name: “It is not simply that the fifth singularity [that Adam resists 
temptation] contradicts the fourth, ‘sinning’, such that a choice has to be made 
between the two. It is that the lines of prolongation that go from this fifth to the three 
others are not convergent, in other words, they do not pass through common values” 
(F, 61). 
 
The third and final stage of ‘Dramatisation’ – again, repeating in a way what we have 
already seen with the passive geneses of art – is “inevitable movement”, in which, 
through the operation of the “dark precursor” of the second stage, both a recognisable 
object and a subject able to recognise it are produced. If resonance involves a certain 
object = x or “communication between differences” (‘D’, 97) and subject = x or 
“difference operator” (‘D’, 97), both of which are incompossible, unable to be 
rendered consistent or reduced to their constituent parts, it is also true that each is 
possible only because of the other. The incompossible subject = x able to span 
different worlds arises only because of a certain object = x it is able to recognise, and 
this incompossible object = x arises only because of a subject = x able to recognise it. 
This is again Deleuze’s version of the transcendental object = x in the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason16, but unlike Kant Deleuze does not 
understand it as readymade. In Kant, the object = x is simply a pre-existing object or 
object-form that underwrites the unity of the subject by providing the empty form 
under which different cognitions can be synthesised. In Deleuze, by contrast, it is only 
as a result of the relationship between the two that object and subject come about, in a 
process Deleuze describes as an “amplitude that goes beyond the most basic series 
[we might say coupling and even resonance] themselves” (‘D’, 97). Indeed, it is both 
the “obscure” subject and the “incompossible” object that are in a way done away with 
to produce the final actualised subject and object, as is apparent in this otherwise 
obscure passage in What is Philosophy?, in which Deleuze and Guattari speak of the 
way that in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics an “objective 
state of affairs” is able to be attained, provided the “respective positions of two of its 
particles are outside of the field of actualisation” (WP?, 129). And it is just this 
separation of subject and object after their momentary coming together in resonance 
that Deleuze calls “inevitable movement” in ‘Dramatisation’. It is precisely through 
this “inevitable movement” that we end up not simply with an individuated body 
made up of extended parts and qualities, but a fully actualised object not defined by 
the sum of its qualities and able to be used in different contexts. (As Deleuze makes 
clear in ‘Dramatisation’, the first moment of active synthesis, coupling, can be 
understood as the drawing out of the virtual singularities of the Idea in extension, and 
  
the second moment of active synthesis, internal resonance, can be understood as the 
differenciation of the virtual relations between parts of the Idea. As he also makes 
clear, this extension of singularities in extension is not possible outside of the 
differenciation of quality, just as this differenciation of quality is not possible outside 
of the extension of singularities. Additionally, it is this coming together of the first 
and second moments in the third moment of inevitable movement that makes both of 
those previous movements possible. However, the truly difficult interpretive question 
is the suggestion here that these spatio-temporal dynamisms Deleuze speaks of in 
‘Dramatisation’ do not just bring about individuation but take us beyond 
individuation to fully actualised and differenciated objects and subjects. To the extent 
that bodies in The Fold and What is Philosophy? appear to be defined by 
convergence, we would say we are not yet at that stage of the second active synthesis 
or what Deleuze calls “common sense”. However, in another way, along the lines of 
the retrospective nature of active synthesis itself, where later stages explain earlier 
stages or earlier stages already contain later stages, perhaps bodies can also be the 
name for the outcome of that third stage of “dramatisation”, inevitable movement, 
that Deleuze describes in ‘Dramatisation’.17) 
 
It is in The Logic of Sense that Deleuze traces in greatest detail this relationship 
between coupling and resonance, individuation and differenctiation and convergence 
and divergence. In the chapter ‘Static Ontological Genesis’ there, he outlines a 
trajectory from what he calls “good sense”, in which individuals are made up of 
“singularities”, laid out next to each other, each of which expresses a world that is 
ultimately consistent with others, through to “common sense”, in which we are 
confronted with a “single ambiguous sign” that crosses worlds that are “divergent” 
from each other (LS, 131). But, again, the crucial aspect for us here is how this 
movement proceeds by means of a certain “incompossibility” (LS, 130), brought 
about by what we have seen Deleuze call in ‘Dramatisation’ an “obscure precursor” 
and in What us Philosophy? a “partial observer”. In asking how we pass from “good” 
to “common” sense, that is, from individuated bodies to differenciated objects and 
then to wider classes and categories, Deleuze at first canvases Husserl’s post-Kantian 
solution of a “sense-bestowing Ego” that “transcends the monad” (LS, 129). 
However, as we have seen, Deleuze rejects this “objective transcendency” (LS, 129), 
whereby a pre-existing subject simply imposes its readymade categories, so that 
experience becomes immanent to it. Rather, for him, it is only within the difference or 
divergence of experience that the possibility of something transcending it arises. As 
he writes: “The Ego as a knowing subject appears only when something is identified 
inside worlds which are nevertheless incompossible and across series which are 
nevertheless divergent” (LS, 130). (All of this is perhaps what Deleuze and Guattari 
mean in What is Philosophy? when they suggest that science is “inspired less by the 
concern for unification in an ordered actual system than by a desire not to distance 
itself too much from chaos, to seek out potentials in order to seize and carry off a part 
of that which haunts it” (WP?, 156).) It is again what Deleuze speaks of in ‘Static 
Ontological Genesis’ as an object = x that is identified between divergent series or 
between incompossible worlds that is more than any individual monad; and the Ego 
that identifies it would similarly be more than any particular monad, thus giving rise 
to something that is not to be found in either of them. Again, Deleuze puts it in terms 
of an irreconcilability of sinning and not sinning that can nevertheless belong to the 
“same” Adam, or the various diverse appearances – ellipse, hyperbola, parabola, 
straight line – that are nevertheless properties of the “same” cone (LS, 130). Deleuze 
  
then turns to a famous short story by Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges, one of the 
key exponents of a contemporary aesthetic of the Neo-Baroque he outlines in The 
Fold, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’, in which various possibilities are suggested for 
the main character – “Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can 
be saved, both can die” (LS, 131) – without any way of deciding which actually takes 
place, and yet all occurring in “similar” worlds and to the “same” character. In each 
case here, as opposed to the individuation of the first level of actualisation, in which 
predicates analytically describe bodies, predicates synthetically define “persons” (LS, 
131), who are more than the mere sum of the qualities that make them up and who run 
across worlds that would otherwise be irreconcilable. It is at this point that the 
possibility of more general classes and categories arises, based on these singular yet 
ambiguous persons, “essentially affected by an increasing or decreasing generality in 
a continuous specification against a categorical background” (LS, 131). That is to say, 
instead of the individual being an effect of the predicates or worlds that make it up, 
breaking off only when another expresses more clearly what they express confusedly, 
with persons it is the predicates or worlds themselves that become variables. It is they 
that change or even appear or disappear, while the person remains the same.  
 
To say all this more slowly, at the end of the ontological genesis we have persons, on 
the basis of which we have “classes with one single member that they constitute and 
properties with one constant that belongs to them” (LS, 132). And we might think of 
this single-member class as a certain “signified” to go with the previous “denoted” of 
good sense and “manifested” of common sense. (In ‘Static Logical Genesis’, Deleuze 
speaks of individuated bodies in terms of a “denoted” and the object = x brought 
about by its conjunction with a subject in terms of a “manifested” (LS, 137).) But, 
almost immediately after speaking of these classes with only one member and one 
constant, Deleuze cuts short his discussion, saying that at this point ontological 
genesis comes to an end and logical genesis begins. For, in fact, these classes with 
only one member and one constant not only open up the possibility of more extensive 
classes with variable properties, but are inseparable from them. Indeed, as Deleuze 
goes on to say, it is these wider logical classes and categories that are the 
retrospective condition of signified objects and subjects (LS, 138). And we can see 
this argument repeated in What is Philosophy? where, after speaking of “partial 
observers” and a “perspective belonging to things themselves” (WP?, 131) towards 
the end of ‘Functives and Concepts’, as something like the equivalence of subject and 
object in common sense, Deleuze and Guattari point to an entirely other order of 
“prospects” at the beginning of ‘Prospects and Concepts’. And in the same way as 
with ontological and logical genesis, the prospect is revealed as the retrospective 
condition of the function, or put otherwise the functive is merely the first of the 
prospects (WP?, 155). But before we turn to the prospect in more detail, we might 
return to the relationship between good and common sense, the individual who marks 
a convergence and whose predicates are analytic and the person who marks a 
divergence and whose predicates are synthetic and, indeed, the wider classes and 
categories that result from these. We might seek to explain what Deleuze means by 
that incompossible object = x common to all or several worlds and why it depends on 
a certain subject = x that is able to recognise it, and furthermore why there is not a 
simple relationship of resemblance between the fully differentiated Idea and the fully 
differenciated object that is its actualisation. And we might attempt to do all this 
through a reading of that author who more than any other Deleuze draws on to 
  
develop a post-Leibnizian metaphysics in both The Fold and The Logic of Sense: 
Borges. 
 
It is not a Borges story we take up here, but an essay, ‘Kafka and His Precursors’. The 
essay, in an imitation or parody of classic literary method, seeks to identify that 
particular quality that defines Kafka by looking at six “precursors” to his work, in 
each of whom we can “recognise his voice, or his habits”:18 the Ancient Greek 
philosopher Zeno, the 9th-century Chinese essayist Han Yu, the 19th-century Danish 
theologian Søren Kierkegaard, the 19th-century English poet Robert Browning, the 
20th-century French novelist Léon Bloy and the 20th-century Irish writer Lord 
Dunsany. After setting out and justifying the case for each precursor, Borges then 
concludes in difficult and complex words: “If I am not mistaken, the heterogeneous 
pieces I have listed resemble Kafka; if I am not mistaken, not all of them resemble 
each other”19. How are we to understand this? On first reading, it cannot but seem 
wrong. Indeed, the truth can appear almost the opposite of what Borges asserts: that 
each of these precursors has something in common with the others (some 
“Kafkaesque” quality), but nothing in common with Kafka (Kafka is a great and 
singular author, whereas they are merely his “precursors”, of interest only in light of 
Kafka himself). However, let us consider this process of comparison or the adducing 
of successive precursors more carefully. A first comparison to Kafka is made, say, to 
Zeno. Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, we feel, capture something of the particular 
Kafkaesque quality we are trying to put our finger on, but not perhaps all of it. In 
order to indicate what of Kafka has been left out, thus introducing a kind of split into 
our Zeno comparison, we put forward our second precursor, Han Yu, and his fable 
about unicorns. And so on. Each successive precursor – this how we are able to keep 
on adding names to the list – is an attempt to speak of what has been left out from the 
comparisons before, to show that they do not speak for all of Kafka. Exactly as 
Borges suggests, then, the list is composed of authors who have nothing in common 
with each other – each is given as an attempt to speak of what has been left out from 
the previous comparisons – and yet all nevertheless have something in common with 
Kafka. Even more profoundly, we might say that each precursor does not so much 
seek to say what Kafka is as attempt to point to what all of the previously provided 
precursors have in common. Each attempts to speak of that real “Kafka” left out, who 
allows all of those others to speak of Kafka. Each attempts to speak of that difference 
between Kafka as a general quality and that particular series of qualities said to define 
Kafka. And the real “Kafka” of Borges’ story, the real “Kafka” all of those various 
precursors are endeavouring to locate, is precisely this difference, the difference that 
allows the “Kafkaesque” or the resemblance between Kafka and his precursors. And 
the list ends, no more precursors can be evidenced, when we can no longer speak of 
that “difference” that allows us to speak of Kafka, when there is no other quality that 
has been left out from the previous series of precursors, which would be the “real” 
Kafka they all have in common. 
 
To put all of this in terms of Deleuze, we might say that this set of precursors in 
extension – that sequence of authors laid out one after another in historical time – is 
an attempt to explicate Kafka as a kind of common sense. What explains the 
quantitative stretching out along the line of good sense is an explication of quality in 
common sense: the attempt to bring out the distinctive quality of Kafka in terms of the 
relationship between his various precursors. But, equally, there can be no common 
sense without good sense: there is no other way to describe this “Kafkaesque” quality 
  
except through that historical sequence of his precursors. However, more profoundly, 
what we see here is that the finally differenciated class or category of the 
“Kafkaesque”, which implies something compossible or in common to its various 
parts, is not possible outside of a “Kafka” that is incompossible or has noting in 
common to its various parts. The various precursors to Kafka do obviously have 
something in common with each other, each has something of the “Kafkaesque” 
about them; and yet this is only because of a “Kafka” that is nothing but the 
difference between its various parts, nothing but the sequence in which each of his 
precursors has nothing in common with the ones before and after. Indeed, to recall the 
coming together of incompossible object and the subject able to recognise it, it is 
obvious that it is Borges who sees the commonality between Kafka and his various 
precursors, who is in effect the difference between Kafka and the Kafkaesque that 
allows them to resemble each other. And, to come back to Deleuze’s perhaps under-
theorised distinction in ‘Static Ontological Genesis’ between an object = x that is 
common to several worlds and an object = x that is common to all worlds (LS, 131), 
we might say that the “Kafka” we are speaking of as the difference between his 
precursors is to be found in all of literature. With the very greatest of authors, those 
who have established a quality that is named after them, we might suggest that all of 
literature is their precursor or has to be read through them (perhaps, in fact, the list 
Borges draws up in ‘Kafka and His Precursors’ can be continued forever). But, again, 
it is also true that, although that fully differenciated object = x must be a nothing in 
common to all worlds, we can only ever see it as a something in common to several 
worlds, insofar as it is always some actual quality that it must be perceived through. It 
is undoubtedly for something like this reason that, although Kafka represents an 
entirely “new value” (LS, 130) without precedent in the history of literature, he can 
only ever be understood through his precursors, that is, those who are already like 
him. And all of this is not unrelated to another complex distinction we might make in 
terms of the relationship between differentiation and differenciation, which is that, 
while each successive precursor might be understood to “double” the virtual Idea of 
Kafka, speak of that “difference” they all have in common, on the level of the actual 
they rather “split” or “bifurcate” him, indicate the next particular quality or difference 
that has been left out. It is for this reason that we are able to say, finally, that the 
process of differenciation does not follow or resemble differentiation, that we cannot 
simply “read off’ the empirical reality of Kafka from his virtual Idea, although the 
two are not in any way separable. 
 
*          *          * 
 
At the beginning of the chapter ‘Static Ontological Genesis’, Deleuze makes the point 
that the “multiple classes and variable properties, which in turn depend on persons are 
not embodied in a third proposition that would again be ontological, but send us over 
to another order of the proposition, and constitute the condition or the form of 
possibility of the logical proposition” (LS, 136). We can see this also in What is 
Philosophy? where, in a similar move, we go from the scientist’s name or even 
“partial observer” at the end of ‘Functives and Concepts’ to the more general classes 
and categories at the beginning of ‘Prospects and Concepts’. As Deleuze and Guattari 
make clear, these more general classes and categories are not another and final type of 
functive, but represent a whole other order, which they call the “prospect” (WP?, 
155).The prospect is defined as the “logicisation of the functive that thus becomes the 
prospects of a proposition” (WP?, 137), in which – and this is undoubtedly a 
  
continuation of the “inevitable movement” of the third and final stage of 
dramatisation – a kind of distance or “disjunction” (WP?, 136) is introduced into the 
functive. That is, as opposed to the functive, which directly constitutes the state of 
affairs as a third variable as a result of the intersection of two variables, the prospect 
only indirectly refers to its referent as something that is outside of it but without 
which it is incomplete. Or, again, as opposed to the individuated monad, which is 
nothing outside of its predicates, and the object of common sense, which does not 
exist outside of the subject perceiving it, both different objects can fill the same 
referent (depending on other conditions being met) and the particular personal 
relationship to the referent is not determinative (it can be any person in principle). The 
prospect, we might say, takes the single-member class produced at the end of 
ontological genesis and generalises it, so that there can be any number of members of 
that class. The example of the prospect Deleuze and Guattari provide in ‘Prospects 
and Concepts’ is the logical proposition “x is human”, in which “being human” is not 
the functive, but merely the value f(a) for the variable x. Here it is not any particular 
functive that is at stake but the very processes and procedures of the functive itself, 
how it refers to its object x – f(a) and not a. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “The 
propositional function ‘x is human’ clearly shows the position of an independent 
variable that does not belong to the function but without which the function is 
incomplete. ‘Being human’ is not itself the functive, but the value of f(a) for the 
variable x” (WP?, 135). 
 
In fact, Deleuze’s point in The Logic of Sense is that the three stages of logical genesis 
repeat those of ontological genesis. Although we have already seen that any final 
order is more complicated than this, just as we move through a denoted, manifested 
and signified in relation to the functive on the level of ontological genesis, so we now 
move through an equivalent denotation, manifestation and signification in relation to 
the prospect on the level of logical genesis. Indeed, as we have suggested, that first 
example of the prospect we looked at – “x is human” – could be said to correspond on 
the level of logic with the state of affairs. That is, the whole first order of logical 
prospects, corresponding to denotation, repeats the steps we saw with individuation in 
functives. With regard to these prospects, Deleuze and Guattari begin by speaking of 
their “extension”, which is the series of values or objects that satisfy its definition, 
each of which is evaluated on the basis of “true or false” (WP?, 136). This is followed 
by a consideration of the prospect’s “intension”, which is the circumstances under 
which those values or objects of denotation are true or false (WP?, 136). If extension  
involves a certain “exoreference” of the prospect, its relation to something outside of 
it, then intension involves a certain “endoreference”, its dependence on certain 
internal conditions (WP?, 130). The well-known example of intension Deleuze and 
Guattari give is Venus as alternately the “evening star” and the “morning star” (WP?, 
136), when of course it is the same Venus each time, according to when it is seen. 
And, finally, we have what Deleuze and Guattari call the referent’s “comprehension” 
(WP?, 137), which is the series of “’essential predicates” by which it is defined. Here 
Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between what may be said of something, 
which is not one of its necessary qualities, and what is strictly part of its definition. 
Thus, “Victor at Jena” is a description or presentation of Napoleon, while “general” is 
a predicate of Bonaparte, insofar as the referent here is the military figure. “Emperor” 
is a predicate of Napoleon, while general or holy emperor are descriptions, insofar as 
the referent here the king. However, the crucial thing in all of this is that what we see 
in this first order of prosects, for all of its suggestion of a later manifestation and 
  
signification, is a certain repetition of the individuation we saw at the beginning of 
‘Functives and Concepts’. What we have in this passage through extension, intension 
and comprehension is a successive movement through states of affairs, things and 
bodies. This becomes clear when Deleuze and Guattari write of the process of logical 
“identification or individuation that takes us from states of affairs to the thing or body 
(object), through operations of quantification that also make possible attribution of the 
thing’s essential predicates” (WP?, 136-7); and later they will describe this second 
order of prospects (after the functives of science itself) as “functions of things, objects 
or individuated bodies”, on which logical descriptions or even logical “states of 
affairs” are brought to bear” (WP?, 155). 
 
In this sense, we might describe this whole sequence of extension, intension and 
comprehension as making up denotation as the first of the prospects or the second of 
the functives.20 But one of the things we notice about the set of qualities attributable 
either to Napoleon or Bonaparte as part of the referent’s comprehension is that, like 
the body in individuation, they are only compossible “predicates” and not 
incompossible “descriptions” or “presentations”. Indeed, as has been noted by several 
commentators, Deleuze and Guattari’s outlining of the notion of reference in logical 
propositions in ‘Prospects and Concepts’ is indebted to Gottlob Frege, the late 19th-
century German logician, whose work is extensively cited in the footnotes to the 
chapter (WP?, 227-28). But in The Logic of Sense, certainly, Deleuze is critical of 
Frege for overlooking the element of “sense” in logic, that “genetic element” (LS, 
139) that grounds both knowledge and the known.21 And, indeed, although Deleuze 
and Guattari are not overtly critical of Frege in ‘Prospects and Concepts’, they again 
seek to install something that goes against or beyond Fregean reference, in a way 
providing a “power of creation” (WP?, 140) for it. It is precisely a transitory moment 
that does not have a settled place in their argument, as so often it or its equivalent 
does not in Deleuze’s model of active genesis. It is a moment that must be understood 
as a “hinge” (WP?, 143) between the second prospect of the logical “states of affairs” 
of things, bodies and objects and a third prospect of opinion or signification. It is a 
moment that we might call “manifestation” in logical genesis, which is a kind of 
replay of the “resonance” between subject and object = x on the level of the 
manifested in ontological genesis. And its position as hinge or half-way point 
indicates that it is that principle of genesis or sense that makes not only Fregean 
reference retrospectively possible but also the general classes and categories of 
signification prospectively possible, even though it eventually disappears into them. 
For after outlining those three moments of the referent or individuation on the level of 
logical propositions and before setting out opinion and signification, Deleuze and 
Guattari speak of what they call concepts or propositions of the “third zone” (WP?, 
140), which as they say are unlike both scientific and logical functives, insofar as they 
do not constitute the clearly demarcated or well-defined sets that we find in either 
mathematical states of affairs or logical propositions. Here, by contrast, we have only 
“vague” or “fuzzy” sets of the kind we face all the time in the “lived” or everyday life 
(WP?, 141). The examples Deleuze and Guattari provide are the categories of 
“redness” and “baldness”, which they describe as “qualitative” or “intensive” 
multiplicities (WP?, 141), in which we cannot unequivocally decide whether a 
particular element or instance belongs to the set or not. Indeed – and Deleuze raises 
the similar problem of the “redness” of a flower in The Logic of Sense (LS, 131-2) – 
this should again remind us the problem of incompossibility in static ontological 
genesis, insofar as there are no strict or unequivocal criteria that would 
  
unambiguously mark something as either in or out. We can only say such things as 
this is “already red” or he is “nearly bald” (WP?, 141), thus being either too late or 
too soon. The solution, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is a kind of subjective 
evaluation or judgement of taste (WP?, 141), but one that is perhaps not unilateral, 
insofar as it also gives rise to the subject that makes it. In this, we should see an echo 
of the actions of that “dark precursor” or subject = x of ontological genesis, which 
similarly discerns something in common to a series of objects or qualities that appear 
to have nothing in common and in doing so also brings itself about. 
 
As we suggest, Deleuze and Guattari characterise this moment of the concepts of the 
“third zone”, like its equivalent moment in ontological genesis, as intermediary. 
These concepts do not still deal with the states of affairs, things and bodies of the 
second prospect, but they are not yet the opinions of the third prospect, although they 
can be classified this way (WP?, 155). Instead, they constitute a “hinge” and pose an 
alternative: either “we end up reconstituting scientific or logical functions for these 
variables, which would make the appeal to philosophical concepts definitively 
useless,” or “we will have to invent a new, especially philosophical type of function, a 
third zone in which everything seems to be strangely reversed, since it will be given 
the task of supporting the other two” (WP?, 141). However, although Deleuze and 
Guattari favour the second of these alternatives, it is only the first that they follow 
because immediately following this they trace – undoubtedly echoing the procedure 
of “inevitable movement” in ontological genesis – a separation of subject and object 
following their coming together in “resonance” or manifestation. Here it is no longer 
“fuzzy” or “intense” categories like “redness” or “baldness”, which are unable to be 
separated form the subjective act that constitutes them, but a kind of putting back 
together of what is already separated.  (In a way, it is like a doubling or repetition of 
that separation and putting back together of subject and object that leads to the 
signified.) We definitively shift to a fully-formed subject with conscious perceptions 
and affections, leaving behind any sense of a presubjective and unconscious percept 
and affect that we had in previous orders of prospects. As Deleuze and Guattari 
describe this third and final order of prospects: “What opinion proposes is a particular 
relationship between an external perception as state of a subject and an internal 
affection as passage from one state to another. We pick out a quality supposedly 
common to several objects that we perceive, and an affection supposedly common to 
several subjects who experience it” (WP?, 144). We are now absolutely in the realm 
of opinion or signification. And perhaps the crucial aspect about it is that it is not a 
specific subject and a particular object or quality (either the extensive individuation of 
denotation or the intensive multiplicities of manifestation), but rather a generic 
subject and general objects or qualities. In the examples Deleuze and Guattari give of 
it, we have not merely the supposedly widely shared sense of the “foul smell” of 
cheese (WP?, 145), but a more and more aggressively pursued universality that 
speaks of all others for all others: “As a man, I consider all women to be unfaithful”, 
“As a woman, I think all men are liars” (WP?, 145). With this third and final order of 
prospects, as we say, genesis appears to come to an end and the “sense” that 
underpins opinion is written out. These opinions would arrive readymade, a matter of 
mere recognition, of stating a pre-existing and unchallengeable consensus. But, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, this “recognition” has always been a poor model for philosophy 
(WP?, 145-6). The subject is never actually universal, but always particular: white, 
male, European (WP?, 149). The strict criterion is always lacking, insofar as those 
wider classes based on pre-existing objects and subjects are never able to be stated 
  
without falling into paradox. Indeed, the very truth of these philosophical functions or 
logical propositions is simply not able to be explained as coming from these classes 
and objects, unless it can also be shown how it gives rise to them, in that manner of 
which Deleuze and Guattari speak.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari throughout What is Philosophy? oppose this model of thought 
as recognition. They contest all transcendental categories – such as subject and object 
– that can be understood to lie outside of genesis. The book is an extended diagnosis 
not only of recent Anglo-American analytic philosophy, which is absolutely erected 
on this model – as we have seen, they evoke humorously, even if a little unfairly, a 
dinner party at Richard Rorty’s at which the guests exchange such opinions (WP?, 
144-5) – but the entire history of philosophy as complicit with this model of 
recognition: from Plato’s test of the “beautiful in nature and good in minds” (WP?, 
148), to Kant’s “a priori propositions or judgement as functions of a whole of possible 
experience” (WP?, 142), to Husserl’s notion of the “lived as immanent to a subject” 
(WP?, 143) and beyond. And yet the first difficulty for Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument here is that they acknowledge that all philosophy – including presumably 
their own – is written in sentences of a “standard language” (WP?, 80), by which we 
might mean involving objective reference and opinion. And the second difficulty is 
that, if their book is in part a long genealogy of the forgetting of genesis in the 
erection of these transcendental categories in philosophy, it also shows just as 
convincingly that the history of philosophy – and perhaps philosophy as such – is the 
attempt to challenge this model, including many of the same philosophers who 
originally propagated it. Plato, in a world already characterised with the Sophists by 
the buying and selling of opinion, sought to go back by means of reminiscence to an 
“original” or “proto” opinion that would be beyond change: “To reach true opinion, 
perception had to be taken as far as the beauty of the perceived and affection as far as 
the test of the good” (WP?, 148). Or Husserl, in a manner similar to Plato, although in 
the opposite direction, attempted to transcend opinion through recourse to everyday 
life. That is, Husserl, like Plato, sought to ascend to a kind of ur-doxa or underlying 
condition for things: “Phenomenology too goes in search of original opinions which 
bind us to the world as to our homeland (earth). It also needs the beautiful and good 
so that the latter are not confused with variable empirical opinion” (WP?, 149). And 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this is the case as well for a contemporary thinker 
like Alain Badiou, who similarly in his philosophy attempts to name that “void” for 
which the symbolic order or what Badiou likes to call the “count-for-one” stands in. 
In other words, Badiou, like Plato (an acknowledged inspiration) and Husserl, seeks 
to identify, as opposed to partial and contingent opinion, an invariant and unchanging 
truth, which would be attained, echoing Plato and Husserl, in an almost mystical or 
apophantic fashion: “Finally, the event appears (or disappears), less as a singularity 
than as a separated aleatory point that is added to or subtracted from the site, within 
the transcendence of the void or the truth as void” (WP?, 152). And Deleuze and 
Guattari are in no sense simply dismissive of these respective philosophical projects. 
For, after all, the fundamental project of philosophy is to break with opinion. Each 
seeks to think the underlying conditions of reality, that for which it stands in. Each 
attempts to think the genetic constitution of reality, how it came about. And yet for 
Deleuze and Guattari at some point each project also stops and imposes a new and 
transcendental condition, that which cannot be explained but must be assumed or 
recognised: in Plato, the Beautiful; in Husserl, the subject; and in Badiou, the void. If 
each philosophical system is critical of opinion, then, it is only to replace it with 
  
another (and perhaps it is even the attempt to do away with opinion that leads to 
opinion in the first place). Each philosopher is in effect merely that “man of 
paradoxes” (WP?, 146), who, if they contest the prevailing doxa does so only in the 
name of another doxa, secretly hoping that their own criticism will in time constitute a 
new doxa. 
 
It is undoubtedly at this point that we can discern a certain “politics” in What is 
Philosophy? Opinion is not only a philosophical but also a political and even 
economic problem. Although this is a methodologically complex position, opinion is 
not merely a matter of philosophical genesis (or its denial), but corresponds both to a 
certain socio-political organisation and a particular historical epoch. As Deleuze and 
Guattari make clear, if the confusion of philosophy and opinion was already present at 
the very beginning of philosophy, it is nevertheless particularly characteristic of our 
time. “We are the ideas men!”, say the creatives (WP?, 10). “We, the conceivers”, 
declare the marketers (WP?, 146). And it is in their Anti-Oedipus that Deleuze and 
Guattari first addressed opinion and how to go beyond it in a way that does not simply 
remain within opinion. In that book, there is a detailed social and historical “allegory” 
of the various stages of genesis, producing an account that was much criticised on 
factual grounds at the time, but without commentators realising that what Deleuze and 
Guattari were advancing was a “universal” history (AO, 140), along the lines of Marx: 
a history that is true, regardless of the “facts”, that is no longer a matter of opinion.22 
The first period they identify is “territorialisation” (AO, 184), which marks the 
beginning of human history and articulates for the first time the family couplings or 
alliances between generations that “forge a system in extension (representation), 
based on the repression of nocturnal intensities” (AO, 185). This corresponds with the 
“good sense” of static ontological genesis, in which borders are drawn and bodies 
individuated. The second period they identify is “despotism” (AO, 192), associated 
with the barbaric state and organised around charismatic leaders, in which the 
extensive alliances of that first territorialisation are now “overcoded” onto the body of 
a despot in a new “disjunctive synthesis” (AO, 198). This corresponds to the 
“common sense” of static ontological genesis, in which an emerging subject puts 
together otherwise incomparable objects to form more general classes and categories. 
Finally – and this is the period that interests us here – we have “capitalism” (AO, 
222), beginning with the collapse of the despotic, “Asiatic” state but equally present 
from the beginning of history, in which an originally deterritorialised form of capital 
and desire is subsequently captured by an “axiomatic” that returns them to value and 
meaning (AO, 224). This corresponds with static logical genesis and particularly to its 
final stage of opinion or signification, which also takes an unlocatable intensity and 
maps it onto wider unities and can be understood to have to have underwritten genesis 
from the beginning. 
 
The self-described task of Anti-Oedipus is to “decode” (AO, 246) capitalism, in a 
process Deleuze and Guattari describe as pushing capitalism to the limit, giving in to 
its “deepest tendency” (AO, 246). But what would this mean? In Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze and Guattari recognise that, precisely like opinion, capitalism works through 
the proposing of exceptions or alternatives to itself. In their words, “it axiomatises on 
the one hand what it decodes on the other” (AO, 246). Undoubtedly reacting against 
the political debates of the day, they put forward a number of these 
“reterritorialisations” or things or values that supposedly go against capitalism: the 
underdeveloped Third World (AO, 231), the limits of human exploitation (AO, 232), 
  
the “pure” knowledge of maths and science (AO, 233), the anti-production of the 
State (AO, 235). But, again, their point is that, far from resisting or inhibiting 
capitalism, it is just on these exceptions that capitalism starts up and expands. (It is for 
this same reason that Deleuze and Guattari describe “human rights” as “axioms” in 
What is Philosophy? (WP?, 107) In fact, far from offering nay kind of a critique of 
capitalism, they come merely to confirm it: it is only through capitalism that we can 
guarantee human rights.) This is the great lesson Deleuze and Guattari take from 
Marx, and the profound interpretation of Marx they offer in their own work. Against 
many readings of him, their Marx does not assert any external or higher value against 
capitalism, classically something like the unalienated or surplus value of labour. 
Rather, it is another moment from Marx that they pay attention to: the “tendency to a 
falling rate of profit” (AO, 228) that Marx noted in the first volume of Capital. 
Marx’s point is that this tendency has “no end, but reproduces itself while 
reproducing the factors that counteract it” (AO, 228). In other words, what Marx is 
remarking upon is the very cycle between re- and deterritorialisation we saw above: 
the fact that every deterritorialisation leads to a further reterritorialisation, but also 
that this reterritorialisation leads to a further deterritorialisation. It is exactly in this 
regard that we might say that Marx thinks the genesis of capitalism, the fact that it is 
total only insofar as it is incomplete. And it is this – this inseparability of re- and 
deterritorialisation – that Deleuze and Guattari ultimately call “deterritorialisation” 
(AO, 231). However, the power of philosophy – we might even say “pure” thought – 
beyond capitalism is that it is able to think this, the ground or plane of immanence 
that makes capitalism at once possible and impossible, never-ending because it is 
never completed. 
 























An enigma is posed when we come with logical propositions and conscious 
representations to the end of genesis. A challenge is raised with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s statement that philosophy is written only in something like opinions (WP?, 
202). It is: why is everything not yet actualized? Why is not all opinion? Or to state 
this from the other end of genesis, why is there still art? Why is there still philosophy? 
In what way are we still able to create concepts and not merely exchange opinions? 
And the answer cannot be that there is still more to be actualised, more to go before 
we get to the end. (And, certainly, while Deleuze and Guattari refer to the event as 
“pure reserve” (WP?, 156) in What is Philosophy?, they do not mean it in this sense.) 
It cannot simply be that there is something left to be actualised because, by the terms 
of Nietzsche’s Eternal Return, which Deleuze and Guattari evoke towards the end of 
‘Prospects and Concepts’ (WP?, 159-60), everything has already happened, we are 
already at the end. It cannot be that something remains to be actualised, therefore, 
because if this were so this actualisation would already have taken place. Rather, we 
might say that everything is not already actualised not because something is left out 
that comes before the actual, but because it is this actualisation itself that leads to 
what must be actualised. We can see this in What is Philosophy? when Deleuze and 
Guattari speak about going down a line that “descends from the virtual to the state of 
affairs” and up a line that goes from the “state of affairs to the virtual” (WP?, 155-6). 
Although the two directions are opposed – going down indicates a progressive 
actualisation and going up a counter-actualisation – they are in fact inseparable. We 
cannot have one without the other. That is, just as the virtual leads to the actual, so 
actualisation produces the virtual. This is also that difficult Leibnizian theme, in 
which we say that not only can we only see the world through the monad, but the 
monad also points to something beyond it. This is to be seen in Deleuze’s use of the 
“frightened face” in Difference and Repetition (DR, 260) and The Logic of Sense (LS, 
346), an example that is repeated in What is Philosophy? (WP?, 17). If in one way 
here, the expressed is only the expression of something, in another way it is also the 
expression of a nothing that is in excess of anything: a “frightened face”, as it were, 
that is in excess of any actual world it might be thought to refer to. (All of this might 
be compared to that moment in Hitchcock’s Lifeboat (1944) – this is precisely that 
moment in cinema when we get expression without it necessarily being an expression 
of anything in the time–image – when we have a shot of the frightened face of a 
rescued German sailor without the matching reverse shot showing us what he is 
frightened of, the former as it were more frightening than anything that could actually 
be shown.)23 
 
It is undoubtedly in Difference and Repetition that Deleuze develops this theme at 
greatest length, with an extended discussion of the relationship between explication 
and implication (DR, 228-30). Deleuze’s argument there – and it is very much an 
argument against Leibniz – is that actualisation does not fundamentally proceed in 
one direction from implication to explication. It is not that what was once implicated 
is now forever explicated. Rather, it is that explication leads to implication, to what 
has to be explicated. As Deleuze writes in the chapter ‘Asymmetrical Synthesis of the 
Sensible’, which is as we have seen where Deleuze outlines the parallels between 
passive and active synthesis and the intensity that runs through both: “It is an 
extension or ‘explication’ which is implicated as such in intensity, which does not 
exist outside the implication or except as implicated, and this because it [implication] 
has the function of making possible the general movement by which that which is 
implicated explicates itself or is explicated” (DR, 229; see also DR, 243). Deleuze 
  
speaks of an “asymmetrical synthesis” (DR, 244) there, insofar as the reciprocal 
synthesis dy/dx of the components of Ideas is continued in the “asymmetrical 
synthesis” that combines the x and y of different intensities in the first functive of the 
state of affairs; but we might also speak of a certain “asymptotic synthesis”, insofar as 
what brings any final actualisation closer is also what moves it away, the more 
genesis completes its task of explicating all intensities the further there is to go. And 
all of this is not unconnected with the other major theme of the chapter, which might 
at first appear unrelated, and that is Deleuze’s elaboration of the relationship between 
Nietzsche and thermodynamics – which we might even restate as the relationship 
between philosophy and science (DR, 223-4, 242-3). Deleuze begins by making the 
point that both Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Return and the discovery of the 
second law of thermodynamics took place around the same time in the second half of 
the 19th century. In fact, Deleuze insists, Nietzsche actually knew of the scientific 
theory of entropy, with its prediction of the eventual “heat death” of the universe, and 
knew moreover that it appeared to go against the possibility of the Eternal Return, in 
which the same events occur over and over, without appearing to run out of energy or 
come to an end (DR, 243). And, Deleuze again asserts, Nietzsche went even further, 
understanding the two doctrines as inseparable and implying each other without 
exception. The Eternal Return can take place only within a horizon set by 
thermodynamics, just as thermodynamics for its part is made possible by the Eternal 
Return. How can this be so? The answer is perhaps suggested by asking why has this 
predicted heat death of the universe not yet occurred? Why is it still taking place? 
And why will it continue to take place forever? Is it not to indicate that it is subject to 
a form of Eternal Return, that this progressive “running down” will carry on forever 
without coming to a definitive end? That the same thing that results from entropy is 
the same thing that continues to feed it? As Deleuze writes, pointing out the 
coincidence between the doctrines of thermodynamics and the Eternal Return: 
 
Are we not led to distinguish two states of quality along with two signs of 
extension? One in which extension remains implicated in the enveloping order 
of differences; the other in which extensity explicates difference and cancels it 
out within a qualified system. This distinction, which cannot be drawn within 
experience, becomes possible from the point of view of the thought of Eternal 
Return (DR, 243-4). 
 
All of this is to indicate that the Eternal Return is not simply a form of voluntarism or 
an effect of the will. Or, to put this in its equivalent terms in What is Philosophy?, that 
“counter-effectuation” Deleuze and Guattari speak of as a “vapour” (WP?, 159) is not 
so much an alternative to the actual, which either might or might not take place, as 
what necessarily accompanies actualisation, outside of which actualisation is not 
possible. It is in this sense that we might say that counter-effectuation is fated, which 
is also to say that it has already occurred, insofar as there is actualisation. As Deleuze 
and Guattari write: “Not willing what happens, with the false will that complains… 
but taking the complaint and rage to the point where they are turned against what 
happens” (WP?, 160). And yet at the same time – and this is the complex position of 
the subject in Deleuze and Guattari’s work – this necessity is not possible unless it is 
willed. In counter-effectuation, will and what is willed come together. One wills once 
for all time and all times come together to produce this single act of will. And this is 
perhaps even what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they speak in ‘Functives and 
Concepts’ of the partial observer as that which does not act but simply perceives and 
  
experiences (WP?, 130). The “subject”, that is, is not the usual transcendental subject 
that is outside of what is – here again is why Deleuze and Guattari reject both 
Husserl’s notion of reality as “immanent to” a subject (WP?, 45-6, 142) and Badiou’s 
finally voluntaristic conception of a subject that comes to a situation from outside 
(WP?, 152) – but is part of the reality that it makes possible. And, finally, this is what 
Deleuze and Guattari mean by speaking of the “event” as a certain “meanwhile” 
(WP?, 158): something neither in the past nor future but that is always missing, that 
passes by in the present unnoticed. “Meanwhile”, we might say, is a kind of “entre-
temps” or “between-times”, not so much what separates one moment from the next as 
what separates one moment from itself, what means that things are the only way they 
can be only insofar as they stand in for something else. 
 
To this extent, we might say that virtual genesis or becoming is at once what allows 
the actual to become actual and what means that the actual can never become actual. 
At the end of genesis, when all is actual, there is still a genesis, which in a way is the 
thought of how things became the way they are. (Nietzsche’s Eternal Return is only 
the very thinking of the Eternal Return. To think the Eternal Return is the very Eternal 
Return we would think.) And where do we see examples of this virtuality at the end of 
genesis in What is Philosophy? Undoubtedly inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
posthumous The Visible and the Invisible,24 and Jacques Lacan’s Seminar XI on the 
gaze,25 Deleuze speaks in ‘Asymmetrical Synthesis’ of a certain distance that allows 
appearance (DR, 230, 253). And beyond this – and this will return us to that 
reciprocal implication of implication and explication that Deleuze speaks of there – he 
will speak of a certain depth that allows distance (DR, 229). In Merleau-Ponty and 
Lacan, depth is frequently figured as a kind of gaze from the side of things, as in the 
famous anamorphic skull of Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533). And the point both 
Merleau-Ponty and Lacan make is that this depth or gaze from the side that is usually 
invisible to us is the symbolic guarantor of the everyday three-dimensional space we 
inhabit. Moreover, Lacan suggests, if we were actually to shift to the side of 
Holbein’s painting and look at the skull “head on”, we would be shocked not only by 
the realisation that we were being looked at before we saw, but also by the thought 
that at this very moment there must be yet another gaze looking on from the side of 
that, allowing us to see what we see.26 It is this that Deleuze means by the depth that 
allows distance: depth is that always implicated virtual dimension that allows 
everything to be explicated, including itself. And we find something similar in 
Deleuze’s famous short text on the French novelist Michel Tournier’s Friday, his 
version of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Deleuze in his essay, through Tournier, 
speaks of the way that, even when Robinson is alone, there is a certain “other” (LS, 
344) necessarily present, a “possibility” (LS, 347) that allows Crusoe to represent the 
world to himself. Indeed, Crusoe would become “psychotic” (LS, 353) if fully 
actualised representation was all that there was and there was no other.27 Or, more 
precisely, even when the island on which he is shipwrecked is all that there is this 
solitariness or self-possession would not be possible without something “outside” it – 
and it is this “other” that is the true Man Friday in Crusoe’s novel. Indeed, the actual 
Man Friday whom Crusoe befriends in Tournier’s novel merely comes to take the 
place of this necessary possibility, and yet he could never entirely take its place, there 
never can be only this fully realised Man Friday. 
 
It is in the same manner that Deleuze and Guattari insist in ‘Prospects and Concepts’ 
that signification does not exist outside of “possibility” and the notion of the “Other 
  
person” (WP?, 138). It is “possibility” here in the technical sense that logical 
propositions attempt to replace the inseparability of philosophical components and 
“combination” of elements we see in ontological genesis with “arithmetical number”, 
the “intensity” or even “intensionality” of manifestation with the requirement that 
what is held together there eventually be distinguished according to the requirements 
of reference. Possibility, as Deleuze puts it in The Logic of Sense, is the “nonsense” 
necessary for sense, the incompossibility necessary for universal logical categories 
(LS, 131-2). But Deleuze and Guattari also mean possibility to speak of the fact that 
we could not actually have representation and communication unless they can be 
carried beyond themselves, go against the empirical facts. (It is here that we might see 
the analogy between Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language and that of someone 
like Kripke, who is getting at something similar with his “counter-factual” notion of 
“baptism”, alluded to in What is Philosophy? (WP?, 8).) But also, beyond this, the 
very ability to represent what is entails a certain otherness or not-all. To represent 
something is necessarily also to counter-effectuate it, to open it up to the possibility 
that it could be other. And this is the case for the entire philosophical project of 
Deleuze and Guattari here. In one sense, what they say is true: all philosophy, 
including their own, is able to communicate only in sentences of “ordinary 
language”.28 However, in another sense, this book they have written in this language 
both allows us to think and already is a certain virtuality. Genesis is the question of 
how things have become as they are, and this question itself – insofar as it suggests 
that things were once otherwise – is already a certain otherness. The process of 
genesis always ends with the actual, but the question or problem of genesis is always 
virtual. The book What is Philosophy?, as we have been trying to suggest throughout, 
is the very philosophy Deleuze and Guattari speak of in it. Of course, it can only take 
the form of ordinary language, opinions, actualised representations, but it also 
constitutes an irrefutable doubling of what is, in which the only way things can be at 
any particular moment can be explained only by the possibility that they were once 
different, a difference that can never be realised, never be completed, except at the 
price of beginning again. (And here, of course, the paradox of a certain not otherwise 
that insists that things could be otherwise.) 
 
In this sense, What is Philosophy? is a failure, always falling short of what it points 
to. It can never actually speak of what it wants to. Like all philosophy perhaps, it can 
only ever indicate what it stands for. For, even looking at things from the oblique 
angle they do, they necessarily miss the depth that makes this possible. However, as 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest of philosophy, as opposed to logic, what it cannot speak 
of it “shows” (WP?, 140). Or, as we have been suggesting here, perhaps even in an 
argument Deleuze and Guattari would not endorse, it metaphorises or allegorises what 
it wants to say. Art, philosophy and science are components of the philosophy 
Deleuze and Guattari construct, and the philosophy they speak of is the philosophy 
that is What is Philosophy? In this regard, the book is, precisely as they say of 
philosophy, “auto-poetic”, “self-reflexive” and “self-referential”. But, in another way, 
all of this is also the sign that What is Philosophy? cannot directly speak of the 
philosophy it wants to. It always misses it, and it is in this miss that philosophy comes 
about. As Deleuze suggests in Nietzsche and Philosophy, the attempt to grasp genesis, 
which we might call the sublime, always fails, but what comes about as a result of this 
failure is philosophy as such: “Not the Overman, who is the positive product of 
critique itself. But man, insofar as he wants to be gone beyond, overcome” (NP, 94). 
Deleuze and Guattari go on to make the point that Kant could write the Critique of 
  
Judgement, in which he theorised the sublime and completed his own philosophical 
system, only in an “unrestrained old age” (WP?, 2). And in a subtle sign that they 
understand What is Philosophy? as following its “critical” project , they note that they 
too have come to write their book in a “moment of grace between life and death, 
when all the parts of the machine come together” (WP?, 1). For them, What is 
Philosophy? is a book that can be written only at the end of their own careers and 
perhaps at the end of philosophy itself with its replacement by “opinion” and the 
“ideas men”. And yet, as Kant shows, if the sublime represents a necessary failure by 
the Imagination, it also represents a necessary success by Reason in being able to 
think this (KP, 51). In other words, Deleuze and Guattari arrive at the end of What is 
Philosophy? only to begin again. They can no sooner think that all is actualised and 
there is nothing left to think than all is counter-actualised in thinking this. This is why 
they can speak of art, philosophy, science and logic in a book called What is 
Philosophy?, why all can simultaneously be components of the concept of philosophy 
they construct: because philosophy is what holds all of these components together, is 
their mutual genesis, is the fact that we are at once at the beginning (art), middle 
(philosophy) and end (science) of things. 
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